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Endogenous Monopsony and the Perverse Effect of the 
Minimum Wage in Small Firms 
 
The minimum wage rate has been introduced in many countries as a means of alleviating the 
poverty of the working poor. This paper shows, however, that an imperfectly enforced 
minimum wage rate causes small firms to face an upward-sloping labor supply schedule. 
Since this turns these firms into endogenous monopsonists, the minimum wage rate has the 
perverse effect of reducing employment in small firms as well as what these firms offer their 
workers. Thus, if there are only small firms, the minimum wage rate makes all workers that 
would be employed in the absence of a minimum wage rate worse off. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J38 
  





Leif Danziger  




E-mail: danziger@bgu.ac.il       
 
                
 1 Introduction
At least since Robinson (1933), it has been recognized that under monopsony a minimum
wage rate may increase both the wage rate and employment. The logic is that with an
upward-sloping labor supply schedule, the marginal labor cost exceeds the wage rate and
thus equals the value of the marginal product of labor at a wage rate that is below the
competitive level (which is where the wage rate equals the value of the marginal product of
labor). As a consequence, a minimum wage rate that is set above the monopsony wage rate
eﬀectively makes the initial part of the labor supply schedule horizontal, and may therefore
reduce the marginal labor cost and increase employment.
T h ep r a c t i c a lr e l e v a n c eo ft h em i n i m u mw a g er a t ea saw o n d e rd r u gf o ri m p r o v i n gt h el o t
of low-pay workers employed by monopsonists is, however, very limited today as geographic
mobility has rendered the isolated company town a thing of the past. In a developed economy,
the typical minimum-wage worker can be found in an urban area working in the retail
trade sector where both the demand and supply side of the labor market are arguably as
competitive as they can get.1
The purpose of this paper is to turn Robinson’s insight on its head and show that
the introduction of a minimum wage rate in a competitive labor market will lead small
ﬁrms to become endogenous monopsonists to the detriment of the welfare of their workers.
Speciﬁcally, we develop a model which demonstrates that a minimum wage rate will cause
as m a l lﬁrm to face an upward-sloping labor supply schedule, and, consequently, to reduce
both what it oﬀers to employed workers and the size of its workforce. The reason is that
the enforcement of the minimum wage rate is imperfect and is mostly based on inspections
prompted by worker complaints.2 However, underpaid workers do often not ﬁle a complaint,
1 Card and Krueger (1995), however, suggest that low-pay labor markets are monopsonistic in order to
explain their empirical ﬁnding that minimum wage increases do not lead to decreases in the employment
of the aﬀected workers. See also Neumark and Wascher (1994, 2000), Dickens et al. (1999), and Card and
Krueger (2000).
2 In the U.S. about 84% of the compliance actions carried out in 2008 by the Employment Standards
1probably out of ignorance or fear of reprisal by the employer or coworkers.3 Moreover, due
to the limited number of inspectors, not all complaints trigger a thorough inspection. Thus,
even in the U.S. where the minimum wage rate is relatively low, noncompliance is surprisingly
widespread. To illustrate, in their seminal study based on the Current Population Survey,
Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) estimate that the overall compliance rate in the U.S. is only
60%, and that the compliance rate for 17-19 year-old males is a mere 35%. In a more recent
study based on the U.S. Department of Labor survey of the apparel industry in the Los
Angeles area, Weil (2005) documents that as much as 27% of all the workers are paid less
than the minimum wage rate. Similarly, using a recent Current Population Survey, Cortes
(2005) ﬁnds that the compliance rate is only 28% for native males and goes down to 20%
for immigrant males.4
In our model, a ﬁrm that is caught paying an endogenously determined subminimum wage
rate is punished by being forced to pay workers back wages and awards, and perhaps also a
ﬁne. Therefore, when deciding what to pay a worker, a ﬁrm will compare the minimum wage
rate to the expected labor cost, which is the subminimum wage rate plus the probability of
the ﬁrm being caught multiplied by the penalty. If the minimum wage rate does not exceed
the expected labor cost, the ﬁrm will pay the minimum wage rate; otherwise it will choose
to pay only the subminimum wage rate.
Since, as mentioned, most inspections of minimum wage infractions are motivated by
Administration’s Wage and Hour Division (for minimum wage and overtime violations) were motivated by
worker complaints (based on U.S. Department of Labor, 2008). Of course, not every complaint is justiﬁed.
3 The typical underpaid worker in the U.S. is an (illegal) immigrant or belongs to some other disadvantaged
group. Furthermore, the Wage and Hour Division will not take legal action unless the worker is willing to
testify in open court.
4 There is even less enforcement in developing countries, presumably due to their meager resources. Thus,
36% of workers in Trinidad and Tobago earn less than the minimum wage rate (Strobl and Walsh, 2003);
35.7% of all private sector workers in Costa Rica earn less than 95% of the minimum wage rate (Gindling
and Terrell, 2005); 8.4% of the workforce in Brazil earn less than the minimum wage rate (Neumark et al.,
2006); 21% of regular workers in Indonesia are paid below the minimum wage rate (Bird and Manning,
2008); 32.4% of workers in Honduras earn less than 90% of the minimum wage rate (Gindling and Terrell,
2009); and about 40% of the population in Paraguay, Ecuador, Guyana, Nicaragua, and Columbia earn less
than 95% of the minimum wage rate (Kristensen and Cunningham, 2006).
2worker complaints, the probability of detection increases with the size of a ﬁrm’s workforce.
Hence, even in the absence of a ﬁne for a noncomplying ﬁrm, if the expected labor cost
were to remain unchanged when the ﬁrm’s workforce increases, the subminimum wage rate
would have to decrease. This would cause an increase in the total pay from a noncomplying
ﬁrm that is caught, with the result that the riskiness of the actual payment to each worker
increases with the size of the workforce. In order to compensate the risk-averse workers for
the additional risk, therefore, the expected labor cost cannot remain unchanged but must
increase with the size of the ﬁrm’s workforce. If a noncomplying ﬁrm is also punished by
having to pay a ﬁne, or if the workers underestimate the likelihood that they will receive
back wages and awards, then this would also cause the size of the ﬁrm’s workforce to have
a positive eﬀect on the expected labor cost.5
The positive relationship between the expected labor cost and the size of the ﬁrm’s
workforce entails that a noncompliant ﬁrm has eﬀectively become a monopsonist.6 Thus,
the larger the ﬁrm, the higher is the expected labor cost that will eventually reach the
minimum wage rate. It follows then that large ﬁrms (which are the more productive ﬁrms)
will comply with the minimum wage rate, while small ﬁrms (which are the less productive
ﬁrms) will cheat and attempt to pay less. Empirically, for the U.S. this is supported by
Weil (2005) who ﬁnds that the smaller the ﬁrm, the more likely it is to pay less than the
minimum wage rate.7 The model also provides a reason for diﬀerentiating the minimum
5 Ashenfelter and Smith (1979), Grenier (1982), and Chang and Ehrlich (1985) have studied the impli-
cations of an imperfectly enforced minimum wage rate for employment, assuming that the probability of
detection is independent of ﬁrm size and that the subminimum wage rate is exogenous. In Yaniv (2001)
the probability of detection depends on the number of underpaid workers, and in Basu et al. (2009) the
probability of detection and the subminimum wage rate are endogenous. Danziger (2009) considers the
eﬀects of an imperfectly enforced minimum wage rate on working hours and welfare.
6 Search costs and informational asymmetries may also generate a positive relationship (Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1994; Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995; Bhaskar et al., 2002; Flinn, 2006; and Basu et al., 2009).
7 For developing countries, Strobl and Walsh (2003) ﬁnd that in Trinidad and Tobago the proportion of
workers that earn less than the minimum wage rate is about four times higher in small ﬁr m st h a ni nl a r g e
ﬁrms, and Gindling and Terrell (2005, 2009) ﬁnd that in Costa Rica and Honduras the proportion of workers
that earn less than the minimum wage rate is about double in small ﬁrms than in large ﬁrms.
3wage rate by ﬁrm size as implemented in the U.S. by Iowa, Minnesota, and West Virginia
(which have state minimum wage rates that are higher for large than for small ﬁrms), and
in some developing countries, e.g., Columbia, Honduras, and Panama. The minimum wage
rate in many other countries, e.g., Argentina, Greece, and Ireland, depends on the sector or
occupation, which could serve as a proxy for ﬁrm size.
Accordingly, our model shows that the existence of an imperfectly enforced minimum
wage rate in an otherwise competitive labor market provides small ﬁrms with endogenous
monopsony power, which results in the minimum wage rate having the perverse eﬀect of
reducing both the employment in small ﬁrms and the well-being of those workers that do
g e te m p l o y e di nt h e s eﬁrms. In particular, if all the ﬁrms are small, then all the workers
that would be employed in the absence of a minimum wage rate are made worse oﬀ by the
minimum wage rate.
2 The Competitive Benchmark
In a low-pay labor market, there is a positive continuum of risk-averse workers each of
whom can supply one unit of homogenous labor to a ﬁrm. Letting w denote the wage rate,
an employed worker’s utility is U(w), where U0(w) > 0a n dU00(w) < 0. The workers’
reservation wage rates are positive, and the density of workers with the reservation wage
rate y is ψ(y) ≥ 0. Hence, the aggregate labor supply is a continuous and weakly increasing
function of w given by S(w) ≡
R w
0 ψ(y)dy.8
There is also a positive continuum of risk-neutral ﬁrms. A ﬁrm’s production function
is af(n), where a>0i st h eﬁrm’s idiosyncratic productivity factor, n is the employment
in the ﬁrm, and f(n) is a common function for all ﬁrms satisfying f(0) = 0, f0(n) > 0,
f00(n) < 0, and f0(0) = ∞. The density of ﬁrms with the idiosyncratic productivity factor
a is η(a) > 0w i t hs u p p o r t( 0 ,a], where a>0. The ﬁr m sa r ep r i c et a k e r si nt h eo u t p u t
8 It is only weakly increasing because ψ(y) may not always be positive.
4market, and the price of output is ﬁxed and equal to unity. In the absence of a minimum
wage rate, a ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt by setting the value of the marginal product equal to
the wage rate, i.e., its employment satisﬁes af0(n)=w.T h eﬁrm’s labor demand is therefore
h(w/a), where h denotes the inverse of f0(n), and f00(n) < 0 implies that h0(w/a) < 0. Thus,
the aggregate labor demand is a continuous and decreasing function of w given by D(w) ≡
R a
0 h(w/a)η(a)da.
To serve as a benchmark, we deﬁne a competitive equilibrium in the absence of a minimum
wage rate:
Deﬁnition: The labor market is in a competitive equilibrium if the wage rate is
such that the aggregate labor supply equals the aggregate labor demand.
We now establish:
Proposition 1: In the absence of a minimum wage rate, there exists a unique
wage rate, w∗, for which the labor market is in a competitive equilibrium.
Proof: The positive reservation wage rates entail that S(0) = 0, which assures that S(w) <
D(w)a tl o ww a g er a t e s ,w h i l ef0(0) = ∞ entails that limw→∞ D(w) = 0, which assures
that S(w) >D (w)a th i g hw a g er a t e s .S i n c eS(w) is continuous and weakly increasing in w
and D(w) is continuous and decreasing in w, there is then a unique wage rate w∗ such that
S(w∗)=D(w∗). ¤
T h u s ,i nt h ea b s e n c eo fam i n i m u mw a g er a t e ,t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u ec o m p e t i t i v ew a g e
rate for which the aggregate labor supply is equal to the aggregate labor demand, and the
labor market is in a competitive equilibrium.
3 The Minimum Wage Rate
We now assume that the labor market is not competitive due to the existence of a statutory
minimum wage rate m that exceeds the competitive wage rate. Enforcement of the minimum
5wage rate is, however, imperfect and to some extent relies on discontented workers ﬁling
a complaint with the enforcement authority. Since it is impossible to know beforehand
whether any particular worker will complain, we assume only that the probability that a
noncomplying ﬁrm will be inspected increases with the size of the ﬁrm’s workforce (until the
probability reaches one). More formally, if φ(n) denotes the probability of inspection, then
φ(0) = 0, φ0(n) > 0i fφ(n) < 1, and φ0(n)=0i fφ(n)=1 .
If the ﬁrm is inspected and found guilty of underpayment, i.e., m − w>0, then the
ﬁrm will be compelled to pay its workers back wages and awards that combined equal
β>0 times the underpayment. The ﬁr mm a ya l s ob ef o r c e dt op a yaﬁne equal to κ ≥ 0
times the underpayment. We assume that p ≡ β +κ>1s ot h a tt h et o t a lp e n a l t yp(m−w)
increases faster than the underpayment. Thus, the ﬁrm would be deterred from underpaying
if detection were certain.
In order to determine whether a ﬁrm will pay workers the full minimum wage rate or only
a subminimum wage rate, let wn denote the lowest subminimum wage rate that a ﬁrm would
need to pay in order to attract n workers. If the ﬁrm is inspected, it would also have to pay
the penalty p(m−wn), so that the actual labor cost to the ﬁrm will be w+
n ≡ wn+p(m−wn).
As the ﬁrm is risk neutral, it is concerned with the expected labor cost, which, for a ﬁrm
that hires n workers at the subminimum wage rate wn,i sg i v e nb y
wn ≡ [1 − φ(n)]wn + φ(n)w
+
n
=[ 1 − φ(n)p]wn + φ(n)pm.
Thus, the ﬁrm will pay the minimum wage rate if the expected labor cost is at least equal
to the minimum wage rate, i.e., if [1 − φ(n)p]wn + φ(n)pm ≥ m ⇔ φ(n)p ≥ 1, which states
that the likelihood that a noncomplying ﬁrm will be punished multiplied by the penalty
rate p is at least equal to one. On the other hand, the ﬁrm will pay a subminimum wage
rate if the expected labor cost is less than the minimum wage rate, i.e., if φ(n)p<1. Since
φ(n)i n c r e a s e si nn (if φ(n) < 1), there exists a critical ﬁrm size ˆ n ≡ φ−1(1/p) such that
φ(n)p R 1a sn R ˆ n.T h u s ,ﬁrms that employ ˆ n workers are indiﬀerent between paying the
6minimum wage rate and paying the subminimum wage rate. However, large ﬁrms, i.e., ﬁrms
that employ more than ˆ n workers, will pay the minimum wage rate, while small ﬁrms, i.e.,
ﬁr m st h a te m p l o yl e s st h a nˆ n workers, will pay a subminimum wage rate.
It is apparent from its deﬁnition that the critical ﬁrm size varies inversely both with
the probability that a violating ﬁrm will be inspected for a given size of its workforce and
with the severity of the penalty for a ﬁrm that is caught. However, the critical ﬁrm size is
independent of all the other model parameters, including the magnitude of the minimum
wage rate, since paying a subminimum wage rate is always associated with an expected wage
cost that exceeds the minimum wage rate if φ(n)p>1, and less than the minimum wage
rate if φ(n)p<1. In contrast, as we shall see below, a ﬁrm’s choice of whether to become
large or small, as well as the actual subminimum wage rate and employment in a small ﬁrm,
are also inﬂuenced by other parameters.
4 Endogenous Monopsonists
If a small ﬁrm that employs n workers is inspected and consequently forced to pay workers
back wages and awards, then a worker’s total pay will be bn ≡ wn + β(m − wn). If there
is no ﬁne, i.e., κ =0 ,t h e nbn = w+
n,w h i l ei ft h eﬁrm must also pay a ﬁne, i.e., κ>0,
then bn <w +
n. As workers may underestimate the probability that they will receive back
wages and awards, we assume that the workers perceive that the probability is  φ(n), where
  ∈ [0,1].9 Hence, a worker’s (perceived) expected utility from employment in a small ﬁrm
with n w o r k e r si s[ 1−  φ(n)]U(wn)+ φ(n)U(bn).
To determine the subminimum wage rate and the associated employment in small ﬁrms,
suppose that the subminimum wage rate in a small ﬁrm is such that a worker’s certainty-
equivalent wage rate, denoted by c,i st h es a m ei na l ls m a l lﬁrms regardless of their size.
9 See Hertwig (2004) et al. and Hau (2009) et al. for evidence that the probability of a rare positive
event (i.e., receiving back wages and awards) is underweighted in decisions based on experience.
7That is, for a given c, the subminimum wage rate wn(c)s a t i s ﬁes10
[1 −  φ(n)]U[wn(c)] +  φ(n)U[bn(c)] = U(c) for all n<ˆ n. (1)
However, small ﬁr m sa r ec o n c e r n e dw i t ht h ee x p e c t e dl a b o rc o s tr a t h e rt h a nw i t ht h e
certainty-equivalent wage rate or the subminimum wage rate, and the following lemma es-
tablishes that there is a monotonically increasing relationship between the expected labor
cost and the size of a ﬁrm’s workforce for a given certainty-equivalent wage rate:
Lemma 1: dwn(c)/dn > 0 for a given c.
Proof: See the Appendix.
To understand the intuition of the lemma, suppose ﬁrst that a noncomplying ﬁrm caught
underpaying only has to pay back wages and awards to the workers, but no ﬁne, and that the
workers correctly discern the probability of receiving back wages and awards. Then bn = w+
n
and   =1 . I faﬁrm’s expected labor cost were to remain unchanged with an increase in
n, and hence also with an increase in the probability that the ﬁrm is inspected and forced
to pay workers back wages and awards, the subminimum wage rate would have to decrease.
However, a decrease in the subminimum wage rate would entail an increase in the total pay
to a worker who receives back wages and awards (because p>1), so the result would be an
increase in the riskiness of the workers’ income.11 As workers are risk averse, the increased
10 Since the subminimum wage rate is then a function of c,w ew r i t ewn(c), w+
n(c), wn(c), and bn(c)f r o m
now on.
11 It follows from the deﬁnition of the expected labor cost and bn(c)=w+






pm[1 − φ(n)] − (p − 1)wn(c)
1 − φ(n)p
.





[1 − φ(n)p]2 < 0,
8riskiness would reduce the certainty-equivalent wage rate. Hence, if the certainty-equivalent
wage rate is to remain unchanged with an increase in n,t h eﬁrm’s expected labor cost must
increase with n in order to compensate the workers for the additional risk.
Suppose next that a noncomplying ﬁrm that is caught must also pay a ﬁne, which drives
a wedge between the ﬁrm’s expected labor cost and the worker’s expected wage rate. That
is, bn <w +
n. Since a higher n m a k e si tm o r el i k e l yt h a tt h eﬁrm is caught and incurs
the ﬁne, the ﬁrm’s expected labor cost increases faster with n than the worker’s expected
wage rate increases with n.T h e e x i s t e n c e o f a ﬁne, therefore, accentuates the increasing
relationship between the expected labor cost and the size of a ﬁrm’s workforce for a given
certainty-equivalent wage rate.
Finally, suppose that the workers underestimate the probability that they will receive
back wages and awards, which drives a further wedge between the ﬁrm’s expected labor
cost and the worker’s expected wage rate. That is,  <1. The magnitude of the underes-
timation increases with φ(n) and hence n, and consequently also accentuates the increasing
relationship between the expected labor cost and the size of a ﬁrm’s workforce for a given
certainty-equivalent wage rate.
The upshot of Lemma 1 is that for a given certainty-equivalent wage rate the imperfectly
enforced minimum wage rate causes the expected marginal labor cost, which is given by
g(n,c) ≡ ∂[nwn(c)]/∂n
= wn(c)+n∂[wn(c)]/∂n,
to exceed the expected labor cost wn(c). This turns the small ﬁrms into endogenous monop-
sonists that pay workers less than the minimumw a g er a t ea n da r ea b l et oh i r ea d d i t i o n a l




p(p − 1)[m − wn(c)]
[1 − φ(n)p]2 > 0.
Since φ(n)i n c r e a s e sw i t hn,f o rag i v e nwn(c), an increase in n leads to a decrease in wn(c)a n dt oa n
increase in bn(c). Thus, a worker’s income becomes riskier when n increases.
95 The Minimum-Wage Equilibrium
Al a r g eﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt by setting the value of the marginal product equal to the
minimum wage rate, i.e., its employment satisﬁes af0(n)=m. Thus, the labor demand of
a large ﬁrm with idiosyncratic productivity factor a is h(m/a), with the ﬁrm selecting the
lucky workers from among those having reservation wage rates not exceeding the minimum
wage rate. The large ﬁrm’s proﬁti st h e nπ 
a(m) ≡ af[h(m/a)] − mh(m/a).
For a given certainty-equivalent wage rate, a small ﬁrm maximizes its expected proﬁt
by setting the value of the marginal product equal to the expected marginal labor cost,
i.e., its employment satisﬁes af0(n)=g(n,c).12 Therefore, the labor demand of a small
ﬁrm, denoted by hs
a(c), is a continuous function of the certainty-equivalent wage rate as well





Each ﬁrm takes the certainty-equivalent wage rate as given in choosing whether to become
al a r g eﬁrm that pays the minimum wage rate, or to become a small ﬁrm that pays a
subminimum wage rate. On the one hand, a large ﬁrm beneﬁt sm o r ef r o mh a v i n gah i g h e r
idiosyncratic productivity factor than does a small ﬁrm,13 while, on the other hand, a small
ﬁrm beneﬁts from the expected wage rate being less than the minimum wage rate. Hence,
there exists a unique critical idiosyncratic productivity factor ˆ a(c)d e ﬁned by π 
ˆ a(c)(m)=
πs
ˆ a(c)(c)s u c ht h a tπ 
a(m) ≷ πs
a(c)a sa ≷ ˆ a(c).14 Accordingly, ﬁr m sw i t ha ni d i o s y n c r a t i c
12 It is assumed that the value of the marginal product of a small ﬁrm falls faster with employment than
does the expected marginal labor cost, i.e., ∂[af0(n)]/∂n < ∂g(n,c)/∂n.T h i sa s s u m p t i o ni sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed
if the expected marginal labor cost is nondecreasing in employment.
13 The envelope theorem implies that the derivative of a large ﬁrm’s proﬁt with respect to a is dπ 
a(m)/da =
f[h(m/a) ] ,a n dt h a tt h ed e r i v a t i v eo fas m a l lﬁrm’s expected proﬁt with respect to a is dπs
a(c)/da = f[hs
a(c)].
Since f0(n) > 0a n dh(m/a) > ˆ n>h s
a(c), it follows that dπ 
a(m)/da > dπs
a(c)/da.
14 Since wˆ n = m, the critical idiosyncratic productivity factor cannot be less than m/f0(ˆ n). If
π 
m/f0(ˆ n)(m)=πs
m/f0(ˆ n)(c), and hence π 
a(m) >π s
a(c) for all a>m / f 0(ˆ n), then ˆ a(c)=m/f0(ˆ n). If
π 
m/f0(ˆ n)(m) <π s
m/f0(ˆ n)(c), and hence π 
a(m) <π s
a(c)f o rs o m ea>m / f 0(ˆ n), then ˆ a(c) >m / f 0(ˆ n). A ﬁrm’s
employment is a continuously increasing function of a except for an upward jump in employment at a =ˆ a(c)
if ˆ a(c) >m / f 0(n).
10productivity factor equal to ˆ a(c) are indiﬀerent between being large and small, while ﬁrms
with an idiosyncratic productivity factor exceeding ˆ a(c) will choose to be large, and ﬁrms
with an idiosyncratic productivity factor less than ˆ a(c) will choose to be small. Of course,
it is possible that the minimum wage rate will be so high that ˆ a(c) > a, in which case even
the most productive ﬁrm will choose to be small and there will be no large ﬁrms. However,
since η(a) > 0f o ra ∈ (0,a], there will always be small ﬁrms.
The aggregate labor supply to the small ﬁr m sc o n s i s t so ft h ew o r k e r sn o te m p l o y e di nt h e
large ﬁrms. The density of these workers, which depends on how the large ﬁrms select their









ˆ a(c) h(m/a)η(a)da is the aggregate employment in the large ﬁr m s( w h i c hi sz e r oi f
there are no large ﬁrms). A worker is indiﬀerent between being employed and unemployed
if the certainty-equivalent wage rate is equal to his reservation wage rate, will want to be
employed if the certainty-equivalent wage rate exceeds his reservation wage rate, and will
want not to be employed if it is less. Hence, the aggregate labor supply to small ﬁr m si sa
continuous and weakly increasing function of c given by Ss(c) ≡
R c
0 ψs(y)dy.
In order to determine the aggregate labor demand of the small ﬁrms, note that if
ˆ a(c)=m/f0(ˆ n), then ˆ a(c)i si n d e p e n d e n to fc. However, since a higher certainty-equivalent
wage rate does not inﬂuence the proﬁto fal a r g eﬁrm, but reduces the expected proﬁt
of a small ﬁrm, if ˆ a(c) >m / f 0(ˆ n), the critical idiosyncratic productivity factor is a con-
tinuously decreasing function of the certainty-equivalent wage rate.15 It follows that
the aggregate labor demand of the small ﬁr m si sac o n t i n u o u sf u n c t i o no fc given by
15 Formally, if ˆ a(c) >m / f 0(ˆ n), diﬀerentiating π 
ˆ a(c)(m)=πs

































We now deﬁne a minimum-wage equilibrium:
Deﬁnition: The labor market is in a minimum-wage equilibrium if the certainty-
equivalent wage rate and the associated critical level of the idiosyncratic produc-
tivity factor are such that
(1) Firms whose idiosyncratic productivity factor exceeds the critical level will be
large, and ﬁrms whose idiosyncratic productivity factor is less than the critical
level will be small.
(2) Each large ﬁrm pays the minimum wage rate and employes the proﬁt-
maximizing workforce consisting of workers whose reservation wage rates do not
exceed the minimum wage rate.
(3) The aggregate labor supply of workers not employed in the large ﬁrms equals
the aggregate labor demand of the small ﬁrms.
We now establish the existence of a minimum-wage equilibrium and compare it to the com-
petitive benchmark:
Proposition 2:
(1) There exists a certainty-equivalent wage rate, c∗, for which the labor market
is in a minimum-wage equilibrium.
(2) The certainty-equivalent wage rate in the minimum-wage equilibrium is less
than the competitive wage rate, that is, c∗ <w ∗.





[1 −  φ(n)]U0[wn(c)] +  φ(n)(1 − β)U0[b
+
n(c)]
is positive (see note 17 in the Appendix), and h[m/ˆ a(c)] >h s





is positive, it follows that dˆ a(c)/dc < 0.
12Proof: Observe that Ss(0) = 0 and Ds(0) > 0( s i n c ef0(0) = ∞ implies that each small
ﬁrm’s labor demand is positive at c = 0) assure that Ss(c) <D s(c)f o rl o wv a l u e so fc.I f
there are only small ﬁrms, then their aggregate labor supply would be Ss(c)=S(c)a n dt h e i r
competitive aggregate labor demand would be D(c)=
R ˆ a(c)
0 h(c/a)η(a)da.T h ef a c tt h a tw∗
is the competitive wage rate then entails that Ss(c) ≥
R ˆ a(c)
0 h(c/a)η(a)da for all c ≥ w∗,
with the inequality being strict except at c = w∗. If there are also large ﬁrms, then these
ﬁrms will hire less workers than they would at the competitive wage rate, which makes the
above inequality strict also at c = w∗, i.e., Ss(c) >
R ˆ a(c)
0 h(c/a)η(a)da for all c ≥ w∗.S i n c e
the monopsony power of the small ﬁrms implies that their aggregate labor demand is lower
than under competitive conditions, i.e., Ds(c) <
R ˆ a(c)
0 h(c/a)η(a)da for c ≥ w∗, it is assured
that Ss(c) >D s(c)f o rc ≥ w∗. Hence, the labor market cannot be in a minimum-wage
equilibrium for any c ≥ w∗. However, since Ss(c) is continuous and weakly increasing in c,
and Ds(c) is continuous in c, there is a certainty-equivalent wage rate c∗ <w ∗ for which
Ss(c∗)=Ds(c∗). ¤
Proposition 2 shows that in the minimum-wage equilibrium any large ﬁrm pays the
minimum wage rate and has its labor demand satisﬁed. At the same time, a subminimum-
wage labor market arises in which a competitively determined certainty-equivalent wage
rate equalizes the labor supply of the workers not employed in the large ﬁrms with the labor
demand of the small ﬁrms. The equilibrium certainty-equivalent wage rate is generally not
unique both because the aggregate labor demand of the small ﬁrms may not always decrease
in c, and because the aggregate labor supply to the small ﬁrms depends on how the large
ﬁrms select their workers from among those with reservation wage rates not exceeding the
minimum wage rate.16 Furthermore, while the equilibrium certainty-equivalent wage rate
16 If the aggregate labor demand of the small ﬁrms always decreases in c, then the highest possible
equilibrium certainty-equivalent wage rate is obtained if all workers hired by the large ﬁrms have reservation
wage rates that are less than the equilibrium certainty-equivalent wage rate. Furthermore, the equilibrium
certainty-equivalent wage rate is lower, the more of the workers hired by the large ﬁrms that have reservation
wage rates exceeding the equilibrium certainty-equivalent wage rate.
13is the same for all workers employed in the small ﬁrms, their subminimum wage rates diﬀer
as they depend on the size of the ﬁrm’s workforce.
Large ﬁrms hire less workers at the minimum wage rate than they would in the competi-
tive equilibrium, and some of their workers may have reservation wage rates that exceed the
competitive wage rate. If the certainty-equivalent wage rate were equal to the competitive
wage rate, therefore, the labor supply of workers not employed in the large ﬁrms would at
least be equal to the labor demand of the small ﬁrms. However, the monopsonistic behavior
of the small ﬁrms reduces their labor demand to less than the competitive level. Hence, the
certainty-equivalent wage rate in the minimum-wage equilibrium is below the competitive
wage rate. This entails that some of the workers who would have been employed by the
small ﬁrms in the competitive equilibrium (and cannot ﬁnd employment in the large ﬁrms,
if there are any, at the minimum wage rate), will not be working at all in the minimum-wage
equilibrium. Thus, in sharp contradiction to its purported goal, the minimum wage rate
has the perverse eﬀect of not only reducing the employment in the small ﬁrms, but also of
making those workers who do get employed in the small ﬁrms worse oﬀ.
Since the small ﬁrms always reduce their labor demand to less than the competitive level
in order to exploit their monopsony power, Proposition 2 is valid whether there are both
large and small ﬁrms, or only small ﬁrms. Consequently, from the fact that c∗ <w ∗ in the
minimum-wage equilibrium, we have the following:
Corollary: If all ﬁrms are small, then all the workers that would be employed
in the competitive equilibrium are worse oﬀ in the minimum-wage equilibrium.
Clearly, the only workers who beneﬁt from the minimum wage rate are those who get
employed in large ﬁrms. Thus, if there are no large ﬁrms, all workers who would be employed
in the absence of a minimum wage rate lose from its existence.
146C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has examined the consequences of introducing a minimum wage rate in an other-
wise competitive low-pay labor market. Our ﬁnding is diametrically opposite to Robinson’s
well-known insight that under monopsony a minimum wage rate can enhance competitive-
ness and thereby increase both the wage rate and the employment of low-pay workers. The
reason is that the minimum wage rate is not perfectly enforced which causes small ﬁrms
to face an upward-sloping labor supply schedule. Speciﬁcally, we show that introducing a
minimum wage rate in a competitive labor market turns small ﬁrms into endogenous monop-
sonists, and that the minimum wage rate therefore has the perverse eﬀect of reducing the
employment in the small ﬁr m sa sw e l la sw h a tt h e s eﬁrms will oﬀer their workers. Thus, if
there are only small ﬁrms, the minimum wage rate makes all workers that would be employed
in the absence of a minimum wage rate worse oﬀ.
15Appendix
We want to show that for a given certainty-equivalent wage rate, the expected labor cost in
small ﬁrms, wn(c), increases with n.N o t e t h a t n does not aﬀect wn(c) directly, but only
indirectly through its eﬀect on φ(n) and further via the eﬀect of φ(n)o nwn(c). Since φ(n)
increases with n (because φ(n) < 1), in order to show that wn(c)i n c r e a s e sw i t hn,i ts u ﬃces
to show that wn(c)i n c r e a s e sw i t hφ(n).













 {U[wn(c)] − U[bn(c)]}








[1 − φ(n)p] {U[wn(c)] − U[bn(c)]}
[1 −  φ(n)]U0[wn(c)] +  φ(n)(1 − β)U0[bn(c)]
,
w h i c hh a st h es a m es i g na s 17
A ≡ [1 −  φ(n)]U
0[wn(c)] +  φ(n)(1 − β)U







Since the utility function is strictly concave and w+







A>[1 −  φ(n) −   +  φ(n)p]U
0[wn(c)] +  φ(n)(1 − β)U
0[bn(c)].
Using that p ≥ β and U0[wn(c)] >U 0[bn(c)], we then obtain that
A>(1 −  )U
0[wn(c)],
which is nonnegative. Consequently, dwn(c)/dφ(n) > 0 and hence dwn(c)/dn > 0. For a
given certainty-equivalent wage rate, therefore, the expected labor cost increases with n.
17 Note that [1 −  φ(n)]U0[wn(c)] +  φ(n)(1 − β)U0[bn(c)] is positive, since it can be written as [1 −
 φ(n)]{U0[w(c)] − U0[bn(c)]} +[ 1−  φ(n)β]U0[bn(c)], where each term is positive.
16References
Ashenfelter, O., Smith, R.S., 1979. Compliance with the minimum wage law. Journal of
Political Economy 87, 333-350.
Basu, A.K.; Chau, N., Kanbur, R., 2009. Turning a blind eye: Costly enforcement, credible
commitment and minimum wage laws, Economic Journal (forthcoming).
Bhaskar, V.; Manning, A., To, T., 2002. Oligopsony and monopsonistic competition in labor
markets. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, 155-174.
Bird, K., Manning, C., 2008. Minimum wages and poverty in a developing country: Simu-
lations from Indonesia’s Household Survey. World Development 36, 916-933.
Card, D., Krueger, A.B., 1995. Myth and measurement: The new economics of the minimum
wage. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Card, D., Krueger, A.B., 2000. Minimum wages and employment: A case study of the fast-
food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Reply. American Economic Review 90,
1397-1420.
Chang, Y-M., Ehrlich, I., 1985. On the economics of compliance with the minimum wage
law. Journal of Political Economy 93, 84-91.
Cortes, K.E., 2005. Wage eﬀects on immigrants from an increase in the minimum wage rate:
An analysis by immigrant industry concentration. IZA Discussion Paper No. 1064.
Danziger, L., 2009. Noncompliance and the eﬀects of the minimum wage on hours and
welfare in competitive labor markets. Labour Economics (forthcoming).
Dickens, R., Machin, S., Manning, A., 1999. The eﬀects of minimum wages on employment:
Theory and evidence from Britain. Journal of Labor Economics 17, 1-22.
Flinn, C.J., 2006. Minimum wage eﬀects on labor market outcomes under search, matching,
and endogenous contact rates. Econometrica 74, 1013-1062.
Gindling, T.H., Terrell, K., 2005. The eﬀect of minimum wages on actual wages in formal
and informal sectors in Costa Rica. World Development 33, 1905-1921.
Gindling, T.H., Terrell, K., 2009. Minimum wages, wages and employment in various sectors
17in Honduras. Labor Economics 16, 291-303.
Grenier, G., 1982. On compliance with the minimum wage law. Journal of Political Economy
90, 184-187.
Hau, R., Pleskac, T.J., Hertwig, R., 2009. Decisions from experience without sampling error.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making (forthcoming).
Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Weber, E.U., Erev, I., 2004. Decisions from experience and the
eﬀect of rare events in risky choice. Psychological Science 15, 534-539.
Kristensen, N., Cunningham, W., 2006. Do minimum wages in Latin America and the
Caribbean matter? Evidence from 19 countries. World Bank Policy Research Paper
3870.
Mortensen, D.T., Pissarides, C.A., 1994. Job creation and job destruction in the theory of
unemployment. Review of Economic Studies 61, 397-415.
Neumark, D., Wascher, W., 1994. Employment eﬀects of minimum and subminimum wages:
Panel data on state minimum wage laws: Reply. Industrial and Labor Relations Review
47, 497-512.
Neumark, D., Wascher, W., 2000. Minimum wages and employment: A case study of the
fast-food industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Comment. American Economic
Review 5, 1362-1396.
Neumark, D.; Cunningham, W., Siga, L., 2006. The eﬀects of the minimum wage in Brazil
on the distribution of family incomes: 1996-2001. Journal of Development Economics
80, 136-159.
Rebitzer, J.B., Taylor, L.J., 1995. The consequences of minimum wage laws: Some new
theoretical ideas. Journal of Public Economics 56, 245-255.
Robinson, J., 1933. The economics of imperfect competition. London, MacMillan.
Strobl, E., Walsh, F., 2003. Minimum wages and compliance: The case of Trinidad and
Tobago. Economic Development and Cultural Change 51, 427-450.
U.S. Department of Labor, 2007, at http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/statistics/2008FiscalYear.htm.
18Weil, D., 2005. Public enforcement/private monitoring: Evaluating a new approach to
regulating the minimum wage. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 58, 238-257.
Yaniv, G., 2001. Minimum wage noncompliance and the employment decision. Journal of
Labor Economics 19, 596-603.
19